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Abstract—Driven by the underlying need for a yet to be 
developed framework for fusing heterogeneous data and 
information at different semantic levels coming from both 
sensory and human sources, we present some results of the 
research being conducted within the NATO Research Task 
Group IST-106 / RTG-051 on “Information Filtering and Multi 
Source Information Fusion”. As part of this on-going effort, we 
discuss here a first outcome of our investigation on multi-level 
fusion. It deals with removing the first hurdle between 
data/information sources and processes being at different levels: 
representation. Our contention here is that a common 
representation and description framework is the premise for 
enabling processing overarching different semantic levels. To this 
end we discuss here the use of the Battle Management Language 
(BML) as a way (“lingua franca”) to encode sensory data, a 
priori and contextual knowledge, both as hard and soft data. 
Keywords— multi-level fusion; hard and soft fusion; Battle 
Management Language; controlled languages; uncertainty 
representation/harmonization 
I. INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of all relevant information originating 
from a growing mass of heterogeneous sources, both device-
based (video, radar, etc.) and human-generated (largely 
expressed in natural language),  is a key factor for the 
production of timely, comprehensive and most accurate 
description of a situation or phenomenon. There is a growing 
need to effectively identify relevant information from the mass 
available, and exploit it through automatic fusion for timely, 
comprehensive and accurate situation awareness. Even if 
exploiting multiple sources, most fusion systems are developed 
for combing just one type of data (e.g. positional data) in order 
to achieve a certain goal (e.g. accurate target tracking). This 
approach does not consider other relevant information that 
could be of different origin, type, and with possibly very 
different representation (e.g. a priori knowledge, contextual 
knowledge, mission orders, risk maps, availability and 
coverage of sensing resources, etc.) but still very significant to 
augment the knowledge about observed entities. Very likely 
this latter type of information could be considered of different 
fusion levels that rarely end up being systematically exploited 
automatically. The result is often stove-piped systems 
dedicated to a single fusion task with limited robustness.  This 
is caused by the lack of an integrative approach for processing 
sensor data (low-level fusion) and semantically rich 
information (high-level fusion) in a holistic manner thus 
effectively implementing a multi-level processing architecture 
and fusion process.   
II. PREVIOUS WORK
The general goal of multi-level fusion is making 
simultaneous use of sensor data processing techniques along 
with high-level processes working on symbolic elements of 
situation such as relationships, categories, etc. It seems clear 
that the ability to interconnect and make interactions among 
processes working at different levels will bring opportunities 
to address with success challenging applications. However, 
the interconnection of information fusion processes operating 
at different levels is a quite recent research topic in 
information fusion, with a limited number of research works 
being published until now. In the following, we highlight 
some related research that appeared in recently organized 
events around the multi-level fusion topic and close area of 
research.  
An analysis of context operations to integrate JDL levels is 
given in [2]. Context has been identified as one of the key 
binding elements to integrate information at different levels 
[3]. The contextual knowledge can be adapted to adjust 
parameters of the algorithms at different levels (e.g. tracking, 
event detection, etc.), accordingly to the sub-areas of the 
observed scenario where this context can be applicable. Some 
analysis of possible extensions of JDL to address new 
requirements including contextual context are presented in [4], 
[5], and the problem of distinguishing the levels of different 
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process in order to define interactions and potential 
advantages is recently considered in [6].  
At the higher levels, an important input is soft data, 
consisting in human-generated information as text or voice. 
An example is the Tractor system [7], developed for text 
understanding in situation assessment problems. Analogously, 
soft data processing has been proposed in counter-insurgency 
examples, such as [8]. An important initiative to test with real 
data set is given by the fusing of soft textual information with 
hard signal information, called Mixed Initiative Soft Fusion 
Implementation Testbed (MISFIT) [9]. In this paper, the 
objective is putting together the content of hard data sources 
with soft sources (mainly texts in unconstrained natural 
language) trying to define a whole “machine-processable”  
representation.  
In the ambient intelligence domain, multi-level 
architectures for the computation of contextual data at a smart 
home environment are presented in [10] and different methods 
at different levels of abstraction are addressed. So, belief 
functions theory is applied to measures included in stable 
abstractions, at the highest layer, and contextual data is 
exploited to provide adapted services. Other interesting area 
where multi-level integration has shown interest is in business 
intelligence and decision support products [11][12].  
A fundamental aspect to inject high-level information is 
representation of uncertainty, as dealt later. As previous work, 
we can mention the analysis on absolute and relative 
conditioning rules for multi-level conditioning in a threat 
assessment problem [13][14]. 
III. MULTI-LEVEL FUSION  
A. An  example scenario 
In order to illustrate the discussion of multi-level fusion 
concepts in this paper, particularly with consideration of 
device-derived and human-derived input from diverse sources 
we present a small example scenario. In particular, we wish to 
show how HUMINT can be combined with sensor-derived 
data. 
A small military facility situated at the edge of a small town 
is bordered by a perimeter fence. A portion of the fence 
borders onto a small woods on one side, while other sides face 
onto open fields. Where the fence borders on fields, it is 
outfitted with an array of acoustic sensors which track activity 
outside the perimeter. Entrance to the facility is via a gate with 
a guard shack which is continuously staffed. There is also a 
routine human patrol along the perimeter. Within the 
compound itself there are various different surveillance motion 
sensors such as video and motion detection. One of the 
buildings on the facility is a lock-up for hazardous substances. 
Because of its location close to the town, it is not unusual 
for there to be normal civilian activity outside of the perimeter 
of the fence. In particular along one portion of the fence there 
is a footpath used by local residents to walk their dogs.  
Children play in the fields and woods near the facility. At night 
wild animals living in the vicinity including deer and fox can 
be seen outside the perimeter. 
Two weeks before the initial time of the scenario (t0), a 
general notice was sent by intelligence that sources indicated 
that there was indications that an attack on a military facility 
would take place in the near future; the target facility was 
unknown, so all facilities were on alert.  
The day before t0 a hole was discovered in the perimeter 
fence near the woods; it is uncertain whether this is indicative 
of a potential attack or not, because there have been incidents 
in the past where the local children have caused minor damage 
to the facility (throwing rocks, digging holes, etc.). The fencing 
cannot be immediately replaced, and, since there is a danger of 
unwanted human or animal entry, a robot outfitted with various 
sensors (camera, motion detectors) is placed near the hole for 
surveillance purposes. 
At night under cover of darkness, the acoustic sensors pick 
up a metallic sound from the perimeter fence which is initially 
identified with a high probability as wire cutters snipping 
fencing. This information is transmitted to a second robot 
which is sent to the coordinates of the possible entry to gather 
information, as the patrolling guard is on his rounds at the other 
end of the facility. He is also notified of the unusual reading 
and abandons his usual round to investigate the event. 
In the meantime, motion detectors report movement, the 
synthesis of which indicates that something or someone is 
moving in the general direction of the HAZMAT storage 
facility. The IR camera on the robot which was sent for 
surveillance transmits the information that the moving object is 
large, probably human. Shortly thereafter the patrol arrives and 
verifies it is human and also reports that he observes the 
intruder drop something next to the HAZMAT facility and 
sends a report to that effect to the watch station at the guard 
shack who requests assistance. The robot is then tasked to 
investigate the object dropped by the intruder and reports a 
detection, via chemical sensor, that there is explosive present. 
All communications within this scenario, whether between 
humans and robots, robots and sensors, is via BML (Battle 
Management Language) which we will describe in more detail 
in section III below. 
B. “Multi-level” is not “hard+soft” fusion 
The scenario described above shows the case of a 
significant amount of data collected over a time span of several 
days from multiple sources comprising sensor arrays, robots, 
and human observations. These data are meant to be received 
by a surveillance processing node able to fuse it and reason 
about possible suspicious activities. For the sake of simplicity, 
we are assuming here a single processing node therefore 
resembling a centralized architecture. The ultimate goal of the 
system is to assist human security operators by pointing out 
unusual patterns that might deserve further human analysis and 
validation. The amount of data is potentially very large as the 
scenario describes illicit activities that require several 
preparation steps several days before the actual breach into the 
monitored area is performed. In any case, such a system is 
supposed to be continuously running collecting both live 
signals from sensors and human observations. In addition to 
this live flow of data, the system is supposed to be able to take 
advantage of static information contained in repositories 
comprising: 1) a priori knowledge of the system (such as 
ontological knowledge supporting the general objectives and 
goals of the system), 2) contextual information relevant to the 
specific site and entities (and their possible relations) being 
monitored, 3) historical observations, that is significant past 
2
events that are logged into the system and build up as time 
passes forming the information the system has accrued so far 
during its operation.  
The data and information just described and available to the 
system encompass a wide range of different pieces, going from 
positional data, to classification labels, to detection of events 
and situations, etc. The live stream from sensors is not assumed 
to be sent directly as raw signals to the processing node but 
messages are sent only upon the detection of simple events of 
interest [15]. This means that a first level of processing is 
performed by the various platforms in order to send formatted 
messages to the fusion node. However, the message maintains 
links to the original signals that can be accessed by the fusion 
node upon request.  
To further clarify the nature of the data/information that the 
system is called to process, it should be noted that in our case 
here data is not only “hard” or “soft”, that is coming from 
sensors or humans, but belongs to different JDL (and 
semantic) levels. As a matter of fact the level of the data and 
the type (hard/soft) are different dimensions and Table 1 
exemplifies all four combinations that can hold.  
TABLE 1. LOW AND HIGH LEVEL DATA VS. HARD AND SOFT SOURCES 
Low-level High-level 
Hard Typically raw numerical data 
such as positional data 
provided by sensors. 
Sensor or system outputs with 
high semantic value such as 
detection of events or 
situations which are  typically 
underpinned by relations 
holding between the elements 
involved in the detected 
pattern (e.g. relations among 
detected entities, relations 
between entites and context, 
etc.). 
Soft Typically numerical 
information (e.g., figures 
giving number of observed 
entities) or text labels 
regarding entities.  
Semantically rich observations 
typically couched in natural 
language.
In particular, what is referred to in Table 1 as “low-level” 
fusion comprises JDL levels 0-1, while “high-level” is 
considered level 2 and above.  
It is clear then that the first step for this significant 
heterogeneity of static and inflowing data and information, 
both hard and soft, has to be couched by a common 
representation means in order to be exploited in a principled 
way thus allowing real multi-level fusion. As we will see in the 
following sections, these messages are encoded according to 
the Battle Management Language [1][19][20].  
C. Analysis: real- vs. long-time, tactical vs operational 
The JDL model proposes to decompose the information 
processing cycle into 4 or 5 levels depending on whether we 
consider the first proposed JDL model or a more recent 
version [4]. We will consider here the model with 4 levels. 
These levels are the following:  
4 – Sensor management, Process refinement 
3 – Impact assessment, threat evaluation 
2 – Situation assessment 
1 – Perception and object refinement 
In an operational environment, the information processing 
includes many loops as shown in Figure 1and Figure 2.  
Figure 1 gives a typical example of air surveillance with 
airborne sensors. There are three layers but there can be more 
if we include, for example, ground sensors. The first layer (at 
the bottom) is a reflex loop where all information is pure 
numerical.  Information processing and decision making are 
automatic at this level.  The semantic level of information is 
very poor (limited mainly to kinematics and sometimes, some 
identity attributes).  It is important to note that at this layer the 
time to react is very short (ms). The second layer is at the level 
of the pilot. He observes the situation thanks to his screen 
(JDL level 1), he understands the situation (Level 2), and then, 
he predicts the enemy‟s action (level 3) and orients his sensor 
to have new information (level 4). In this layer the information 
is more elaborate (situation on the screen but also human 
information provided by pilots of others aircrafts. Here, the 
time to react is short (few seconds) but the human is in the 
loop and he is in charge of taking decision. The third level is 
at the C2 level, for example in an AWACS, the situation 
designed in this layer is the fusion of the situation provided by 
the lower level in many fighters plus the information provided 
by the AWACS sensors. In this layer the time to react is 
longer (few seconds to minutes).   
Figure 1. Air surveillance 
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Part of the processing is automatic (fusion) and a second 
part is manual (track management). In this example the 
information in the first layer is vehiculated by an internal 
network to the aircraft.  However, communications between 
layer 2 and layer 3 are done using Link 16. The local 
situations from the individual aircrafts are communicated to 
the C2 where they are fused.  The fused situation is pushed 
back from the C2 to each aircraft and this situation is then 
considered as the reference situation.  
Figure 2, gives an example of ground surveillance. In the 
first layer, the information is both numerical provided by 
sensors and verbal (human) provided by operators. The main 
part of the processing is done by operators. The time to react 
is much longer than in the first layer of Figure 1; it can vary 
from few hours to a day. The semantic of information is 
higher than the one of the first layer in Figure 1 because the 
information includes reports provided by human. In the 
second layer of Figure 2, the information roots are the lower 
layers and sensors, assigned to this layer, outputs. The 
information can be structured, with a data model like 
JC3IEDM (Joint Consultation Command and Control 
Information Exchange Data Model) Non-structured messages 
provided by humans with a very limited vocabulary and 
numerical data are also available and must be fused with the 
situation provided by lower layers. The third layer is similar to 
the second one but with a longer period of time. The language 
to carry the information between layers can be BML in the 
same way as the example in Section III.A. Figure 1 and Figure 
2 depict only one loop in each layer. However, in a real 
scenario, there are many loops in a layer as it is show in 
Figure 3.  
In a layer, the loops can communicate between themselves 
(red arrows) and can send the results of their fusion process to 
the immediate upper layer (blue arrows). A loop in a layer can 
also make the fusion of the received result from a lower loop 
and its own sensors output and send back the result to the 
lower layer (green arrows) as a reference situation.  
IV. BML ENABLED FUSION 
One of the major hurdles in fusing device-derived data, 
which is predominantly quantitative in nature and human-
generated data, produced in natural language, is finding a 
representation which can easily and effectively handle data 
and information from all types of sources in a standardized 
manner. Within the context of our work, we are using Battle 
Management Language (BML), developed under the aegis of 
NATO and used for military communications (orders, requests 
and reports) [19].  
BML was created as an unambiguous language which 
allows automatic processing of statements, including 
information gathered by both humans and by devices, 
therefore making it an ideal vehicle for fusion. It is a 
controlled language [17] based on a formal grammar, Lexical 
Functional Grammar (LFG) [18] from the field of computation 
linguistics. While the original goal of BML was to facilitate 
the exchange of orders and requests between C2 systems of 
various NATO countries, it was later expanded to include 
various types of reports [20]. These report types include not 
only HUMINT information on own and enemy activities, but 
also status reports, location reports, task completion reports, 
etc.  While such reports may be generated directly in BML via 
an interface, there has been considerable work on the 
automatic analysis of natural language text (HUMINT, 
OSINT, etc.) and conversion into BML [21]. Furthermore, 
BML statements can be generated uniformly even when 
underlying natural languages are different [22], easing cross-
border communications.  
The next step from communications between human 
players on the battlefield was the extension of BML to include 
communications with robotic forces [23], including swarms, 
drones, and unmanned vehicles. Because the robotic forces are 
Figure 2. Battlefield surveillance 
Figure 3. Processing loops between layers. 
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outfitted with sensors of various types, BML report types were 
developed (e.g., sensor readings) [24] or extended (e.g., 
location report). The BML statements are generated by 
middleware or by algorithms reporting data or results.  
The end result is that all information flowing between 
humans and devices in the area of endeavor can be represented 
in the same standardized automatically processable format. 
The difference between a location report from a human patrol 
and a location report from a robot will be essentially identical: 
only the identity of the report (mechanical or flesh and blood) 
will be different [25], and also their associated uncertainties 
(see Section IV.D) 
This means that the fusion algorithms working upon 
received data need only to “understand” (i.e., be able to parse 
BML statements for the relevant data needed) and to be able to 
produce their results as BML statements for use within the 
complex system of humans and devices to support multilevel 
fusion. 
It should be noted that BML is a standardized 
representation of complex information which preserves that 
information in context, generally that of the “5 Ws”: who, 
what, where, when and why. The information contained within 
a BML statement may be considered comparable to an 
arguments list from one function to another within a 
programming language. There is other work in controlled 
language which, at first glance, appear to be similar to BML. 
However, there is a significant fundamental difference in, for 
example, Controlled English (CE) and BML. CE in contrast to 
BML focuses on the extraction of information in order to 
perform reasoning upon that information using logical 
constructs [26][27]. BML simply presents information in 
context, in a system-independent, standardized allowing the 
algorithms used by other processes to access all or part of this 
information as needed. Thus, BML statements can be parsed 
by CE and converted to CE format for further analysis and 
reasoning.  
 
A. BML in action 
 
Using the scenario described above (Section IIIA) the 
original HUMINT report (warning) has already been 
converted into BML for fusion processing.  As a result, the 
"perimeter breach" threat model has been activated but has not 
reached critical mass (i.e., is “humming” in the background). 
A patrol registered the first fence break-in via BML, as the 
patrolling soldier has been fitted with a tablet fastened to his 
arm with a BML interface for reporting. This statement has 
been processed automatically by the system and the warning 
level in the threat model has climbed slightly, but is not yet 
registering actual danger (the hole may have been the work of 
local children, who have pulled pranks before). Then the 
acoustic sensor array picks up noises, which are conveyed to 
the low-level fusion algorithm which identifies the sound as a 
metal-on-metal, likely wire cutters, at a location calculated by 
the algorithm and that algorithm delivers its results to the 
system. This time the threat model kicks up to a higher threat 
level and begins to transmit warnings of a possible perimeter 
breach along the fence to the human (guard) at the 
guardshack. At the same time, the system issues an automatic 
order to the closest patrol robot to proceed to the location 
identified by the acoustic sensor array algorithm, and likewise 
sends the (BML) notification to the (foot) patrolling guard 
who also proceeds to investigate. When the robot approaches 
the specified location, its motion detector / IR camera 
(whatever) verify the presence of movement and a large 
object, possibly human, and again the system is notified so 
that the threat model kicks up yet another notch (i.e., the 
"yellow" warning turns to "orange"). Stationary motion 
detectors located on various buildings register movement, 
each movement is processed and from that the probable 
direction of the movement is identified by another algorithm 
as being in the direction of a sensitive facility and that result is 
sent via BML to the system and distributed to the humans 
(guard and patrol). The patrolling solder verifies via his 
forearm-tablet using BML that the "large object" detected by 
the robot are two humans inside the perimeter fence who are 
carrying something toward the building which the motion 
detector algorithm has identified as the possible target and the 
threat model moves to "red alert" mode and an automatic 
transcript of the system proceedings is forwarded to the next 
level of contact within the command (to HQ or whatever). 
Once the threat level has reached the point that this 
information goes up the line, the up-line center would receive 
real-time information forwarded by the local system (which 
consists of men and machines). 
When fusing information from ontologically different 
sources, uncertainty of information, obtained from the 
particular sources, plays an important role. When, additionally, 
these sources produce information on different processing 
levels, the importance of the uncertainty raises significantly.  
One of the hurdles for the analysis of uncertainty of 
information derived from multiple types of sources, and in 
particular, when fusing device-based and human-based 
information is how to harmonize the uncertainty in order to 
make it appropriate and useful. Much of the uncertainty in 
device-based data can handle by knowledge of calibration, 
previous performance, environmental factors, etc. Uncertainty 
in human language may be based upon perception, intention 
and, motivation of the source and as well as the interpretation 
of the words themselves by the receiver of the information, 
factors which may be much more slippery to determine.  
In such case information uncertainty must undergo scrutiny, 
being examined on many points. Also the uncertainty 
representation should be a subject of extensive analysis in 
order to guarantee that: If one source is “better” than others 
then uncertainty representation has to be able to indicate that.  
B. Expressing uncertainty in BML 
C2LG introduces a possibility to examine information 
provided by a source on many points. Namely, each report line 
is tagged with “Certainty” attribute, which consists of three 
constituents: one mandatory: “Credibility”, and two optional: 
“InformationSource” and “Reliability” [1]. 
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“Credibility” expresses the degree of the trustworthiness of 
the information reported as evaluated by reporter [1]. By 
definition, it may be either: “reported as fact”, “reported as 
plausible”, “reported as uncertain” or “indeterminate”. 
Cr RPTFCT, RPTPLA, RPTUNC, IND
“InformationSource” denotes the type of source from 
which the reporter obtained the information [1]. By definition 
it may be one of several values such as “eyeball observation”, , 
“human intelligence,” “refugee” or “prisoner of war”. This 
value allows the identification of whether the information is 
first party or third party, which has an effect on the certainty of 
the information in the statement. For example, “eyeball” 
indicates that the reporter has personally observed the reported 
event, whereas other values indicate that the information was 
obtained via other informants and may therefore be less 
reliable. It also allows the factoring in of a “class” weighting, 
for example, when in the theatre of operations information 
from refugees tends to be quite reliable, one may factor this 
into the certainty of the information received from such 
individuals.  
IS EYOBSN, refugee, POW
“Reliability” expresses the degree by which source can be 
trusted according to the reporter [1]. By definition it can be 
either: “completely reliable”, “usually reliable”, “fairly 
reliable”, “not usually reliable”, “unreliable” or “reliability 
cannot be judged”. 
R A, B, C, D, E, F
C. Exploiting BML representations for uncertainty 
management 
 “Certainty” information expressed in BML may be used 
effectively in order to manage uncertainty in multi-level fusion 
system. “Credibility”, “InformationSource”, and “Reliability” 
attributes provide a descriptive view of vagueness of both: the 
source and the information it is providing. Even though some 
of the relationships among these different constituents of 
“certainty” may be easily drawn based on logic or common 
sense, e.g. “…if  “InformationSource” is set to EYOBSN 
eyeball observation it is unlikely that “Reliability” will be 
given as D (unreliable)…” [1], it is important to have them 
defined explicitly.  
In order to define the precise relationships the most 
convenient way is to convert them into numbers, and then to 
establish the necessary dependencies.   
1) Transforming labels into numbers
For two of the attributes (Cr and R) transformation of 
qualitative descriptions, expressing information uncertainty 
into quantitative ones may be easily achieved by selecting 
appropriate number intervals (for each of the attribute values), 
and then simple assignment of medians of these intervals to the 
particular labels, e.g. for (1) it may be as shown in Table 2. 
Note that “InformationSource” attribute cannot be transformed 
in such a way due to the fact it refers to different observation 
means, not to the degree of trust. 
TABLE 2. EXAMPLE OF LABEL-TO-VALUE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE “CREDIBILITY” ATTRIBUTE 
Labels RPTFCT RPTPLA RPTUNC IND 
Intervals 0.75-1 0.5-0.74 0.25-0.49 0-0.24 
Values 0.875 0.625 0.375 0.125 
Fortunately, this attribute is highly correlated with 
“Reliability” attribute, which undergoes the mapping 
mentioned above. Therefore even if “InformationSource” is 
omitted while assessing quantitative uncertainties it does not 
matter due to the fact that its meaning for manageable 
uncertainty resides mainly in reliability of the source it is 
indicating.  
2) Modification of uncertainty
While discussing label-to-number transformation of the 
uncertainty attributes a question may be raised: Why medians, 
not maximal (or minimal) values, have been taken as 
representatives of the particular value intervals? The answer is 
that this kind of solution enables easy modification, both: 
increasing and decreasing their values in the subsequent stages 
of information processing. 
The above mentioned modification may have two origins: 
intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic origin may be conditioned 
by specific algorithms of quality degradation, mostly as a 
function of elapsing time. The extrinsic origin may result from 
fusion when additional information is available. In both cases 
precise determination of the uncertainty changes can be 
performed only if appropriate process specification is 
delivered.  
In general, one may deduce that intrinsic degradation pace 
depends on the particular source, which can be reasoned from 
“InformationSource” attribute. This may perform a sort of 
application of this attribute that even though it is not directly 
mapped like “Credibility” and “Reliability” it affects the 
quality degradation pace. It is worth of notice that the quality 
affection may refer to “Credibility”, which is a requirement 
very often stated in specifications for C2 systems, as well as to 
“Reliability” if appropriate amount of statistic data is collected.  
3) Decision defer
One of the basic reasons for uncertainty management is 
decision-making. Thus, the uncertainty information is 
important not only due to the fact it enables to “glue” other 
pieces of information properly or deal with intrinsic and 
extrinsic modifications, but also directly allows the operator of 
the fusion system to make decision upon it.      
Sophisticated algorithms of data association may produce 
seemingly useful information, however if it is to be utilized 
effectively its certainty (expressed in terms of the introduced 
measures of “Credibility” and “Reliability”) must be above the 
predefined thresholds. In other cases decision should be 
deferred.      
4) Multi-statement
The basic role of BML as Battle Management Language is 
to enable the preparation, transmission and receiving of the 
reports and commands.  
It aims more at communicating with short and concise 
messages rather than encompassing the full analysis of the 
tactical situation.  
From the perspective of fusion system architecture it 
conducts hard-decision fusion due to the fact that a report in 
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itself, even though it is tagged with uncertainty information, 
performs a form of decision. 
In order to enable soft-decision fusion with usage of BML 
multiple reports from the same source must be sent. Then, 
global uncertainty constituents must be calculated based on the 
respective partial ones, obtained directly from the report 
messages.   
However, this is not a standard regime of BML usage, and 
probably will be used only on middle-levels of fusion systems.    
D. Harmonisation of multi-source BML information 
When integrating complex fusion subsystems one has to be 
aware that information which is up to the fusion process may 
be of different processing levels. In the practical term that 
means that „a common denominator‟ is required in order to 
establish the contribution weights properly with respect to their 
informational incomes, and uncertainties of information they 
are providing.   
Having “Credibility” and “Reliability” attributes expressed 
in numbers together with paces of degradation of each one of 
them, one may assume to have in their hands a well defined 
“common denominator”. For example if one source provides 
information with an error smaller than another “Credibility” of 
such information should be relatively greater. On the other 
hand, when two sources provide information of the similar 
“Credibility”, and one source performs a complex system while 
the other is a radar, the “Reliability” of the first one may (but 
does not necessary have to) be greater than the other‟s but the 
pace of information degradation of the first one is expected to 
be much slower than the other‟s.  
In the above case, harmonization of the uncertainty 
information may be achieved by appropriate processing of 
“Credibility” and “Reliability” values of the participants of the 
fusion. There are diverse techniques which can be applied 
starting with weighted averaging, through probabilistic 
arithmetic, and finalizing with evidential techniques.    
However, the most problematic seems to be the 
transformation of uncertainty information to the numerical 
forms of “Credibility” and “Reliability”. In subsection C.1) it 
was presented how values of these two attributes may be 
retrieved based on their label substitutes. Nevertheless, in case 
of specific low level fusion subsystems there is a need for 
defining “Credibility” and “Reliability” based on estimation 
errors and possibly on covariance matrices. On the other hand, 
considering the reverse conversion, BML may be regarded as a 
bottleneck in communication between tracking systems, due to 
the obvious fact that conversion from “Credibility” and 
“Reliability” to tracking covariances will never be flawless.      
BML as a communication medium among different fusion 
centers probably will never be flawless in terms of information 
transformation (especially uncertainty information). As lingua 
franca it must be a subject of some compromise and in most 
cases transforming information from a certain original protocol 
to BML and back to the original protocol it will never lead to 
the same information. However, that is not the point. One may 
accept this loss if in return gets some additional information 
from different system. That makes BML a powerful tool, due 
to the fact it enables information enhancement by its exchange. 
Even though the resulting information in some cases is not as 
precise as in the source subsystem, it is far more adequate due 
to the synergy with other subsystems.  
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have discussed a the use of BML as a 
lingua franca, that is a common communication mechanism to 
interface fusion processes at different levels and dealing with 
data and information coming from both human and device 
based sources. An illustrative example has been developed to 
show the capability to integrate information from multi-level 
hard and soft sources, and we have discussed also how 
uncertainty could be encoded in the corresponding messages. 
Further work will be directed to the algorithmic exploitation of 
the messages generated for a surveillance scenario being 
developed within the NATO Research Task Group IST-106 / 
RTG-051 on “Information Filtering and Multi Source 
Information Fusion”. 
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